Introduction

The Arctic has long been considered a peripheral region of the Earth, far removed from the world’s political and economic centers. Driven by continued global warming, Arctic sea ice is melting at an accelerated pace, the commercial value of Arctic shipping routes is being continuously revealed, and the development potential of strategic resources such as Arctic oil, gas, and minerals is becoming increasingly prominent. Geopolitica, competition over rules and development in the Arctic region is intensifying simultaneously. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the original operating mechanism of the Arctic Council suffered a systemic shock, the seven other Arctic states suspended official cooperation with Russia within the Arctic Council, and significant cracks appeared in the Arctic multilateral governance system. The limitations of the traditional governance framework were fully exposed, and the international community urgently needs new cooperation concepts and the provision of public goods [1].

As an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs, China is a signatory to the Svalbard Treaty and a formal observer state of the Arctic Council. It has proposed the cooperation initiative of jointly developing the «Ice Silk Road» and has continued to expand its Arctic practices in many fields such as polar scientific research, Arctic shipping, energy development, ecological protection, and cold-region technology. Over the past three years (2022–2025), the author has conducted field research in the high-latitude Far East and Arctic regions of Russia on multiple occasions, covering core areas such as the Kamchatka Peninsula, Yakutsk, and Khabarovsk holding multiple in-depth discussions with local government officials, energy company practitioners, and representatives of indigenous peoples. The author also attended high-level international platforms such as the Eastern Economic Forum and the Northern Forum of Russia on multiple occasions and delivered keynote speeches on topics such as the coordinated development of the North Pacific and the Arctic Ocean, the sustainable development of Arctic shipping routes, and the reform of multilateral Arctic governance. These interactions enabled this author to gain a direct understanding of the cooperation demands of Russia and Arctic countries and to develop a deeper understanding of the complex situation of opportunities, contradictions, and risks coexisting under the current changes in the Arctic.

While domestic academic research on Arctic governance and cooperation continues to grow, there is still room for improvement in comprehensive, long-term studies that are grounded in the new landscape of great power competition, incorporate firsthand field research experience, systematically trace the complete evolution of China’s Arctic policy, assess cooperation opportunities and risks, and assess medium- and long-term development trends.

Accordingly, this paper systematically reviews the four-stage evolution of China’s Arctic policy since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, analyzing the internal logic and external drivers of policy iteration; focuses on the current fragmented landscape of Arctic governance, clarifying the current status, opportunities, and challenges of cooperation between China and Arctic states; and interprets the multidimensional strategic value of the Arctic from a national strategic perspective, predicting the future direction of China’s participation in Arctic affairs. This paper aims to move beyond the narrative that «external countries’ intervention in the Arctic is geopolitical expansion» found in some Western policy and academic discourse and seeks to clarify the rationale of China’s participation in Arctic affairs. The article argues that China seeks to position itself as a pragmatic partner in sustainable Arctic development, a participant in existing governance frameworks, and a provider of international public goods.



The Evolution of China’s Arctic Policy

China’s deep understanding and improved policies regarding the Arctic are associated with its enhanced comprehensive national strength, the advancement of its maritime power, and its increased participation in global governance. Along with accompanying changes in the global climate pattern and the iterative development of the international geopolitical situation, China’s Arctic practices have undergone a progressive development from passive awareness to active exploration, from institutional entry to strategic shaping, and from routine participation to adaptation to changing circumstances. This can be broadly divided into four historical stages: initial scientific exploration, institutional entry, strategic shaping, and adaptation to changing circumstances.



Initial Scientific Exploration Stage (1949–2012): with Scientific Research as the Core, Limited Participation in Arctic Affairs

In the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the focus of national development was on domestic economic recovery and the construction of near-shore marine industries. The Arctic was relatively distant from the national economic and social development system, and domestic Arctic-related work remained at the level of basic scientific understanding.

In 1925, the Beiyang government signed the Treaty of Svalbard, laying a solid international legal foundation for China’s legitimate scientific research and other activities in Svalbard. However, for decades after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China did not conduct any substantive field scientific research in the Arctic [2]. During this period, domestic Arctic research mainly focused on translating and introducing foreign literature, concentrating on basic theoretical fields such as Arctic meteorology, glaciers, and geology. A national-level special Arctic policy and overall strategic layout had not yet been formed.

After the reform and opening up since 1978, China’s polar cause officially started, prioritizing the construction of the Antarctic research system while gradually launching Arctic exploration work. In 1996, China officially joined the International Arctic Scientific Committee (IASC), marking China’s full access to the international Arctic scientific cooperation system. In 1999, relying on the research vessel «Xuelong», China completed its first large-scale Arctic scientific expedition, achieving a breakthrough in China’s field Arctic scientific research. In 2004, China built its first Arctic research station, the Yellow River Station, in the Ny-Ålesund region of Svalbard, Norway, establishing a routine land-based long-term observation platform. This platform facilitated continuous multidisciplinary observation and research in areas such as upper atmospheric physics, glacier dynamics monitoring, polar ecological environment, and space physics, thus constructing a basic system for China’s Arctic scientific research [3].

During this period, the core objective of China’s Arctic practice was to understand and explore the Arctic. The main participants were universities and research institutes, with national support provided by the Polar Research Program. Diplomatic participation was limited to scientific multilateral mechanisms, and a systematic and comprehensive discourse on Arctic foreign policy had not yet materialized. The 2007 Russian flag-planting incident on the Arctic seabed sparked heated global discussions on Arctic sovereignty, resource development, and shipping route utilization, rapidly boosting domestic Arctic academic research.

The academic community began in-depth discussions on Arctic identity, and the academic concept of «near-Arctic states» gradually emerged, accumulating sufficient academic reserves for subsequent national Arctic policy formulation. In 2012, China and Iceland signed the Arctic Cooperation Framework Agreement, marking the first Arctic-specific cooperation document signed between China and an Arctic state. This formally opened a window for bilateral pragmatic cooperation and laid an important foundation for subsequent efforts to obtain observer status in the Arctic Council and expand multilateral cooperation. Overall, China’s Arctic practice at this stage was characterized by scientific research, legal groundwork, and limited participation. China was merely a scientific participant in Arctic affairs, with its core objectives being to solidify scientific understanding of the Arctic and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests granted to extra-regional states under international law. The Arctic was not yet integrated into China’s core foreign policy system.



Institutional Entry Stage (2013–2017): Obtaining Observer Status and Expanding Diverse Cooperation Practices

2013 was a crucial institutional milestone in the evolution of China’s Arctic policy. On May 15th of that year, the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council was held in Kiruna, Sweden, formally approving China, Italy, Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore as observer states of the Arctic Council. This breakthrough marked China’s formal entry into the core multilateral governance mechanism of the Arctic, transforming it from a single scientific participant into an institutionalized and regular participant in Arctic governance [4].

After becoming an observer state, China strictly adhered to its observer commitments, dispatching professional and technical personnel to participate in the Arctic Council’s working groups on search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and oil spill response. It continuously shared Arctic scientific research data, polar observation technologies, and governance experience, deeply integrating into the multilateral Arctic governance process.

This institutional breakthrough significantly broadened the boundaries of China’s Arctic practices, extending its participation from polar scientific research to diverse fields such as shipping, energy, trade, and science and technology. In the shipping sector, in 2013, COSCO Shipping’s «Yongsheng» successfully completed a commercial trial voyage through the Northeast Passage, opening a new maritime channel for Sino-European trade and verifying the feasibility of commercial navigation along the Arctic route. Since then, regular commercial voyages have gradually been implemented, and domestic shipping companies have begun to systematically develop Arctic logistics systems. In the area of bilateral initiatives, based on Sino-Icelandic cooperation, China and Russia established a regular dialogue mechanism on Arctic affairs. Sino-Russian Arctic energy cooperation officially broke through, and the Yamal LNG project was launched, initiating negotiations and progress, becoming a benchmark project for pragmatic Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation.

At the policy level, Arctic issues have been formally incorporated into the overall framework of building maritime power. Following the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, academia and policy research communities have actively explored pathways for connecting Arctic shipping routes with the land and maritime Silk Roads, and the concept of the «Ice Silk Road» cooperation is gradually taking shape. Field research in the Russian Far East during this phase reveals a strong demand from local governments and energy companies for Chinese capital, markets, and shipping capabilities, hoping to leverage the Chinese market to unlock the potential of Arctic resource development and revitalize the Far East’s economy.
However, overall, no national-level Arctic-specific policy White paper has been issued at this stage. China’s Arctic stance, cooperation principles, and development plans are scattered throughout speeches by national leaders, diplomatic statements, and bilateral agreements, and a systematic policy discourse is still under construction. Internationally, some Western countries have begun to develop strategic vigilance regarding China’s Arctic participation, and questions about China’s observer status are gradually emerging, indicating initial geopolitical constraints. However, the overall environment for multilateral Arctic cooperation remains relatively relaxed. In short, the institutional entry phase has achieved a substantial change in China’s Arctic participation status and a comprehensive expansion of cooperation scenarios, but significant deficiencies remain in top-level institutional design.



Strategic Formulation Stage (2018–2021): White Paper Released, «Ice Silk Road» Fully Proposed

On January 26, 2018, the State Council Information Office released the White Paper «China’s Arctic Policy», which is China’s first programmatic official document on the Arctic. The White Paper fully established the four core policy objectives of «understanding the Arctic, protecting the Arctic, utilizing the Arctic and participating in the governance of the Arctic», clearly defined China’s official status as an «important stakeholder in Arctic affairs», and formally proposed the cooperation initiative of jointly building the «Ice Silk Road», marking the systematization and institutionalization of China’s Arctic policy [5].

The White Paper clearly explained China’s core position on Arctic governance: strictly respecting the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Arctic states, abiding by the international legal norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Svalbard Treaty, adhering to the principle of ecological protection first, advocating equal dialogue and cooperation among multiple stakeholders, and opposing bloc-based politics, militarization, and exclusive approaches to Arctic governance [5].

After the release of the White Paper, China’s all-round Arctic practice system was fully formed. First, the polar scientific research system has been upgraded and iterated. The «Xuelong» and «Xuelong 2» icebreakers have formed a regular «dual-dragon polar exploration» pattern, significantly increasing the frequency of comprehensive Arctic Ocean scientific expeditions and making multilateral joint polar scientific expeditions a regular practice.

Second, the «Ice Silk Road» has moved from conceptualization to concrete implementation. The Yamal LNG project has been fully completed and put into operation, and polar natural gas is stably imported into China through the Arctic shipping route, consolidating the foundation for Sino-Russian energy cooperation. COSCO Shipping has continued to expand the scale of its Arctic commercial voyages and explored a regular and large-scale operation model for the Sino-European Arctic route. Third, multilateral and bilateral cooperation has been promoted in a coordinated manner. While participating in global governance through the Arctic Council, Sino-Russian Arctic strategic cooperation has been deepened, and polar science, technology, and ecological academic exchanges with Nordic countries such as Iceland and Norway have been maintained. The Northern Sea Route, as a core navigation channel in the Arctic, has become a core carrier for the construction of the «Ice Silk Road» [6].

At the national top-level planning level, the «14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Outline of Long-Term Goals for 2035» explicitly included «participating in pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic and building the “Ice Silk Road”», marking the formal inclusion of Arctic affairs into the national medium- and long-term economic and social development strategy system [7].

During this stage, China formally established its triple identity as a participant, builder, and responsible contributor to Arctic affairs, and its Arctic work shifted from being driven solely by scientific research to a multi-dimensional coordinated approach encompassing scientific research, diplomacy, trade, ecology, and technology. At the same time, external strategic pressure continued to rise. The new version of the US Arctic strategy placed great power competition at its core, and Western media advanced narratives concerning a perceived «China Arctic threat», interpreting China’s normal and compliant scientific research, investment, and shipping activities in a securitized and politicized manner. Media criticism and institutional constraints also intensified.



The Stage of Adjustment to Change (2022 to present): Conflict Impacts Governance Structure, Selective Deep Participation

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 became a historic turning point in reshaping the Arctic governance structure. Of the eight member states of the Arctic Council, seven are NATO members except for Russia. Due to the spillover effects of geopolitical conflicts outside the region, the seven Western countries announced a complete suspension of official cooperation with Russia under the Arctic Council framework. The Arctic Council’s multilateral mechanism was once in a state of partial suspension, and the traditional intergovernmental multilateral cooperation channels were substantially disrupted. Arctic governance entered a more fragmented phase characterized by reduced pan-Arctic cooperation [7].

Faced with the structural changes in the Arctic governance system, China’s Arctic policy has entered a new stage of adhering to principles and making flexible adjustments. On the one hand, it has always adhered to the core principles established in the White paper «China’s Arctic Policy», abided by the framework of international law, insisted on ecological priority, and maintained a neutral position, resolutely refusing to participate in Arctic geopolitical bloc confrontation. On the other hand, it has adapted to the reduced effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms and established a pragmatic model of selective and in-depth participation. At the multilateral level, it has continued to retain permanent observer seats in the Arctic Council, maintained normalized participation on less politically sensitive issues such as climate governance, marine ecological protection, and polar scientific research, and safeguarded the basic position of multilateral governance; the focus of pragmatic cooperation has been fully shifted to the bilateral aspects, and in-depth Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation has become the core tool for China’s participation in Arctic affairs.

Based on multiple field investigations in the Russian Far East and surrounding Arctic regions, it is evident that following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Western capital, technology, and services have substantially reduced their involvement from the Russian Arctic market. Russia’s Arctic development faces multiple challenges, including funding shortages, logistical disruptions, and technological gaps. The strategic demand for opening up to the outside world and seeking third-party cooperation has increased significantly, highlighting the strategic value and urgent need for complementary cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic. Currently, the Arctic LNG 2 project continues to develop under significant external constraints, cargo volume along the Northern Sea Route remains high, the China — Europe Arctic shipping services have continued to develop, and comprehensive cooperation between China and Russia in energy, shipping, cold-region engineering, and polar scientific research continues to deepen. Simultaneously, China has not severed its communication channels with the Nordic and Arctic countries, maintaining cooperation in science and technology and ecology through think tank dialogues, university collaborations, and non-governmental academic exchanges to avoid the risk of complete decoupling.

On international platforms such as the Northern Forum in Russia, the author has repeatedly emphasized the core argument that Arctic climate change, ecological protection, and the development of indigenous peoples are public issues concerning all humanity and should not become appendages of conflicts between external powers, much less a front line in geopolitical games. As a regional multilateral platform led by Russia, the Northern Forum effectively fills the dialogue gap left by the reduced effectiveness of the Arctic Council mechanism, becoming an important supplementary vehicle for communication and cooperation among diverse Arctic stakeholders amidst changing circumstances. Overall, the core characteristics of China’s Arctic policy at this stage can be summarized as: unwavering adherence to principles, maintaining its position in multilateralism, focusing on practical bilateral cooperation, and addressing shortcomings through non-governmental initiatives. This approach steadily, orderly, and controllably advances pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic within a volatile great power rivalry.

A review of the four stages of evolution clearly reveals that the iterative upgrading of China’s Arctic policy is an objective necessity arising from the enhancement of its comprehensive national strength, maritime rights, and global governance capabilities. China consistently adheres to international law as its fundamental guide and sustainable development as its core orientation, proactively adapting to changes in the Arctic’s geopolitical and ecological landscape. It is an upholder and builder of the Arctic order, rather than a challenger to it.



Current Status, Opportunities and Challenges of Cooperation between China and Arctic-related Countries

The current Arctic governance pattern is undergoing structural reshaping. The effectiveness of traditional multilateral mechanisms is declining, great power competition continues to heat up, and the economic implications of climate change continue to evolve. China’s Arctic cooperation has formed an overall pattern that is mainly bilateral and supplemented by multilateralism, with China-Russia cooperation as the core fulcrum and Nordic scientific and technological exchanges as the supplement. Opportunities and challenges are deeply intertwined and coexist for a long time.



Current Status of Cooperation

a. Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation has become a major axis of extra-regional Arctic cooperation

After the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, China-Russia Arctic pragmatic cooperation has become one of the most extensive forms of Arctic cooperation involving a non-Arctic state. It covers five core areas: energy development, shipping logistics, polar scientific research, cold area engineering, and local cooperation, forming a broad and increasingly institutionalized cooperation framework.

In terms of energy development, the Yamal LNG project is a global benchmark polar energy project with recoverable natural gas reserves of approximately 1.3 trillion cubic meters and an annual production capacity of 16.5 million tons. Since the project was put into stable operation, a large amount of polar liquefied natural gas has been imported into China through the Arctic waterways, effectively enriching China’s energy import channels and improving the resilience of energy supply [8].

The Arctic LNG 2 project continues to be constructed steadily, with Chinese companies deeply involved in investment, construction and operations, building a long-term stable, mutually beneficial Sino-Russian polar energy supply chain.

In terms of shipping logistics, the Northern Sea Route, as the core carrier of the «Ice Silk Road», continues to demonstrate commercial value. COSCO Shipping continues to develop its Arctic shipping model, covering diverse categories such as bulk cargo, LNG, heavy cargo, containers, etc., and the China — Europe Arctic Express is in normal operation. Compared with the traditional Suez Canal route, the Arctic route can significantly shorten the Asia — Europe voyage, reduce logistics costs, shipping carbon emissions, and provide a new strategic alternative channel for China-Europe trade.

In terms of science and technology and engineering cooperation, China and Russia regularly carry out joint scientific expeditions in the Arctic Ocean, focusing on sharing data and jointly building research systems in polar climate, glacier change, marine ecology and other fields; in core permafrost cities such as Yakutsk, they jointly carry out research on frozen soil engineering, polar disaster early warning, and infrastructure construction technology in cold areas, and accumulate experience in engineering construction in extreme environments. At the local level of cooperation, China has established a normalized dialogue mechanism with Russia’s Sakha Republic, Kamchatka Territory, Khabarovsk Territory and other Arctic-related federal entities, and has reached a number of cooperation mechanisms in the fields of mineral development, polar tourism, infrastructure construction, etc., and the willingness for local cooperation continues to rise.

b. With the Nordic and Arctic countries: focus on scientific, technological and cultural exchanges, economic and trade cooperation is limited

Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark (Greenland) are the five Nordic Arctic countries and are the core leaders of Arctic governance rules. Before the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, China had a good atmosphere for Arctic cooperation with the Nordic countries. It formed a benchmark cooperation with Iceland in geothermal development and polar scientific research and maintained high-frequency academic exchanges with universities and polar research institutes in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

Following the deterioration of the geopolitical environment, the Nordic countries adopted a more cautious approach to Arctic cooperation with China, reflecting broader changes in the European security environment, closer coordination within NATO, and growing concerns regarding strategic dependencies. The promotion of large-scale economic, trade and energy projects at the official level has basically stalled, and the scope of cooperation has shrunk to basic scientific research, think tank exchanges, university cooperation, ecological research and other non-governmental low-sensitive areas. Although bilateral pragmatic economic and trade cooperation is limited, dialogue channels in basic scientific fields such as climate glaciers, marine ecology, and polar biology have always been open, leaving basic space for future cooperation to pick up.

c. Multilateral mechanism level: retain core seats and expand complementary multilateral platforms

Within the framework of the Arctic Council, China continues to adhere to its permanent observer status and participates in working group research discussions and academic exchanges under the premise of compliance. However, due to the semi-paralysis of the mechanism, the space for substantive policy negotiations and project collaboration has been greatly reduced. In order to solve the dilemma of multilateral cooperation, China has taken the initiative to expand diversified supplementary platforms: relying on emerging multilateral mechanisms such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to promote global southern countries to pay attention to Arctic governance issues and strive for the legitimate rights and interests of countries outside the region; making full use of second-track platforms such as the Northern Forum and the Polar Think Tank Forum, continuing to promote Chinese concepts of sustainable development and inclusive governance in the Arctic, and use non-governmental diplomacy and think tank dialogue to make up for the functional shortcomings of official multilateral mechanisms.



Real Opportunities for China to Participate in Arctic Affairs

a. Sea ice melting unlocks economic dividends from waterways and optimizes the pattern of China’s foreign trade channels

Continued global warming has driven the Arctic sea ice area to shrink year by year. The navigation window period of the Northern Sea Route has continued to be extended and the stability of navigation has continued to improve, opening up a new strategic channel for Asia-Europe trade. According to statistics from Rosatom, the cargo volume of the Northern Sea Route reached 37.9 million tons in 2024; the annual cargo volume in 2025 reached 37.02 million tons. Affected by the adjustment of the overseas transportation rhythm of some large LNG ships, it will fall slightly compared with 2024, but it will continue to operate at a high level, and the commercial navigation pattern has basically taken shape [9].

The normalized navigation of Arctic waterways can effectively optimize the layout of China’s international trade routes, break the traditional reliance on a single channel pattern such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, disperse geopolitical risks in sea lanes, and enhance the resilience of the foreign trade supply chain. At the same time, the demand for Arctic shipping continues to expand, forcing China to upgrade its upstream and downstream industrial chains such as polar ship manufacturing, ice area equipment research and development, polar logistics services, sea ice monitoring and navigation, and cultivate new growth points for the high-end marine economy.

b. The global energy pattern is restructured, and the complementarity of resource cooperation between China and Russia is highlighted

The Arctic region is rich in strategic resources such as massive oil, gas, and rare minerals. The oil and gas resources in Russia’s Arctic waters alone have an oil equivalent of approximately 240 billion barrels. It is a core strategic resource reserve area that has not yet been fully developed in the world [10].

Against the background that the global energy supply chain continues to fluctuate and the energy competition between major powers intensifies, Russia is subject to comprehensive sanctions from the West, Arctic development is in urgent need of external capital, market and technical support, and hence, the demand for cooperation with China continues to rise.

Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation has natural complementary advantages: China has sufficient capital reserves, mature engineering construction capabilities, and a large and stable consumer market; Russia has unique Arctic resource endowments and waterway location advantages. The two sides have formed a complete industrial chain collaboration in polar energy mining, LNG transportation, cold area infrastructure, resource deep processing and other fields. This mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation model is presented by the parties as a cooperative model for energy development and an important support for China-Russia strategic cooperation under changing circumstances.

c. The window period for governance system reform to help China export the concept of inclusive governance

From the perspective advanced in this article, the traditional Arctic governance system has been dominated by Arctic and Western states and has faced criticism concerning inclusiveness and the balance of interests. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has completely exposed the fragility and limitations of the old system. The governance concepts of ecological priority, mutual benefit and win-win, diversity, inclusiveness, and fair co-governance advocated by China are in line with the core needs of sustainable development of the Arctic and can provide new ideas for Arctic governance reform.

Arctic issues are both global and public and are related to issues common to all mankind such as climate change, ocean protection, indigenous rights, and sustainable development. Relying on the practice of Arctic participation, China has implemented global development initiatives and global governance initiatives, which can provide a reference path for countries outside the Global South to participate in polar governance, broaden participation in discussions on Arctic rule-making, and broaden the opportunities for constructive participation of non-Arctic states in areas of common interest, while respecting the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states and their special responsibility for the sustainable development of the region.

d. Official cooperation encounters obstacles, and the space for track-two diplomacy and local cooperation continues to open up

In the context of the formation of intergovernmental multilateral mechanisms and limited official cooperation, the value of second-track diplomacy such as think tank dialogue, university cooperation, local government docking, and non-governmental academic exchanges has become prominent. The regional platform represented by the Russian Northern Forum has become the core carrier for countries to exchange Arctic governance concepts and dock cooperation needs.

Judging from front-line research experience, the willingness of local governments, enterprises, and academic circles in the Russian Far East to cooperate with China is significantly higher than the conservative attitude at the central level. Local cooperation, non-governmental cooperation, and think tank cooperation are less affected by geopolitical interference and more flexible. They can accumulate public opinion and lay the foundation for projects for national-level strategic cooperation and have become an important breakthrough for China to expand Arctic cooperation.



Multiple Practical Challenges in the Cooperation Process

a. The securitization of Western geopolitical narratives, and the continued escalation of political and institutional constraints

The United States has incorporated the Arctic into the core frontier of strategic competition between major powers, has increasingly framed China’s Arctic activities through a security lens, including China’s polar scientific research, commercial investment, shipping operations and other compliance behaviors. At the same time, the United States has exerted diplomatic pressure on the Nordic and Arctic countries through its alliance system, contributing to tighter Arctic cooperation policies toward China and raise the entry threshold for countries outside the region. This has formed a combination of political criticism and institutional constraints, seriously disrupting the normal order of cooperation between China and Nordic countries.

b. Russia’s sovereignty is prudently controlled, and there are structural constraints on bilateral cooperation

Although Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is generally improving, Russia has always maintained a highly cautious attitude towards Arctic territorial sovereignty, waterway management and control, and strategic resources. Russia has set strict control clauses in terms of Northern Sea Route passage rules, charging mechanism, foreign shareholding ratio, core resource development authority, etc., and the negotiation period of major projects is long and the threshold for implementation is high. At the same time, the Russian Far East Arctic has weak infrastructure, lack of supporting services, shortage of professional talents, and complex geological conditions of frozen soil, resulting in high Arctic project construction costs, high risks, and long investment return cycles, which form rigid constraints on project operations and long-term cooperation.

c. Due to ecological fragility and constraints on indigenous rights and interests, project compliance costs are extremely high

The Arctic ecosystem is highly sensitive to environmental disturbance and often has limited capacity for rapid recovery. Development activities can easily cause irreversible ecological damage. Global environmental organizations and international public opinion maintain high-intensity supervision of Arctic development. At the same time, Arctic indigenous people have lived here for generations, and their traditional livelihoods, folk culture, and survival rights need to be fully respected and protected.

Any Arctic development project must pass strict environmental impact assessment, social impact assessment and indigenous rights assessment, significantly raising the compliance threshold for project design, construction and operation. The lack of complete ecological protection and social responsibility system can easily lead to public controversy and project risks. This requires Chinese companies to embed ecological protection, livelihood protection, and cultural respect into the entire project process.

d. Multilateral rules are fragmented and the risk of institutional uncertainty is prominent

After the effectiveness of the Arctic Council has been weakened, rules in areas such as Arctic waterway access, seabed resource development, polar environmental standards, and definition of shipping responsibilities remain incomplete, contested, or subject to differing interpretations, and most of them are dominated by «soft laws» without mandatory binding force. Countries have different understandings of the legal status and transit rights of the Northern Sea Route. As a result, cross-border operations of enterprises face problems such as opaque rules, inconsistent standards, and high compliance risks. Regulatory uncertainty not only increases the cost of cooperation but also means that the window period for rules framing has opened. It is urgent for China to participate in the construction of rules through responsible practice.

e. There are shortcomings in domestic core capabilities, and the comprehensive support system needs to be improved

Compared with the established Arctic countries in Europe and the United States, China’s comprehensive Arctic capabilities still have obvious shortcomings: the number of heavy-duty polar icebreakers is insufficient, and the core technology of high-end ice-area ships requires further development; there are few Arctic field observation sites, and a large-scale three-dimensional ocean observation network has not yet been formed; there is a huge gap in comprehensive professional talents who are familiar with Arctic international law, indigenous culture, Russian, and Nordic languages; and the cross-departmental Arctic affairs coordination mechanism still needs to be optimized. Capability shortcomings have become the core bottleneck restricting China’s deep participation in Arctic governance and high-end pragmatic cooperation.



The Strategic Value of the Arctic and the Development Trend of China’s Participation in Arctic Affairs

(a) The Multiple Strategic Values of the Arctic for China

The Arctic is not a remote, peripheral region, but a core strategic space deeply connected to China’s national security and long-term development. Its value covers five core dimensions: climate security, trade routes, energy security, technological strength, and global governance.

Climate Security Value: Directly Affecting the Ecological Stability of China. The Arctic acts as an «amplifier» and «early warning system» for global climate change. Changes in Arctic atmospheric circulation, sea ice melting, and greenhouse gas release from permafrost directly affect the East Asian monsoon trend, the frequency of cold waves in China, and the intensity of extreme weather events. Conducting effective Arctic observation and research is a crucial prerequisite for China to accurately assess climate change, prevent meteorological disasters, and build a national ecological security system.

Route Security Value: Strengthening the Strategic Resilience of the Foreign Trade Supply Chain. As a new strategic route for Sino-European trade, the Arctic shipping route does not replace traditional routes but forms a complementary, risk-hedging shipping pattern. It effectively addresses the geopolitical risks of being blocked or constrained by a single maritime route, ensuring the safety and stability of China’s foreign trade logistics system, while simultaneously driving the development of domestic polar shipping, port, and equipment industry clusters.

Value of Energy Security: Building a Diversified Resource Supply System. The Arctic’s abundant oil, gas, and rare mineral resources are an important supplement to China’s diversified energy and strategic resource import strategy, effectively optimizing the resource supply structure, reducing the risks of relying on a single import channel, and providing long-term guarantees for national energy security. China has always adhered to the principles of ecological priority, moderate development, and mutual benefit, abandoning the extensive resource plundering model.

Building a Technologically Strong Nation: A High-end Technology Testing Ground in Extreme Environments. The Arctic’s extreme low temperatures, complex sea conditions, and unique geological features provide a natural testing ground for the nation’s high-end manufacturing, marine engineering, deep-sea exploration, and meteorological research capabilities. In 2025, China launched its largest Arctic scientific expedition to date, assembling the «Xuelong 2», «Polar», «Shenhai Yihao», and «Tansuo Sanhao» vessels to conduct a comprehensive survey of the Arctic Ocean, achieving its first manned deep-sea submersible operation in the Arctic ice zone, marking a significant advance in polar deep-sea exploration technology. Polar scientific expeditions have continuously driven the iterative upgrading of core technologies in China, such as icebreaking equipment, deep-sea diving technology, cold-region engineering, and permafrost management, becoming an important support for building a science and technology powerhouse.

Global Governance Value: A Key Tool for Participating in International Rule-Making. Arctic governance encompasses multiple core global governance issues, including climate, ocean, human rights, and international law, making it an important arena for great-power competition over global governance. China’s participation in Arctic affairs, safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of extra-regional countries and advocating for the Global South, can effectively enhance China’s influence in polar governance and promote the construction of a more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable new global governance order.

Based on the evolutionary logic of Arctic policy, the current geopolitical landscape, and firsthand research practices, China’s participation in Arctic affairs in the medium to long term will exhibit five major development trends: steady progress, improved quality and efficiency, and upholding principles while innovating.



Five Major Development Trends in China’s Future Participation in Arctic Affairs

Trend 1: Upholding Policy Foundations and Solidifying the Participation Path of «Maintaining a Position in Multilateral Cooperation, Substantiating Bilateral Cooperation, and Filling the Gaps in Track II»

China will consistently adhere to the core principles established in the 2018 Arctic White Paper, respecting the sovereignty of Arctic states, upholding international law, prioritizing ecological protection, and resolutely rejecting a development path of geopolitical expansion and bloc confrontation. At the multilateral level, China will continue to maintain its observer status in the Arctic Council, safeguarding the fundamental position of multilateral governance; at the bilateral level, it will continue to deepen Sino-Russian Arctic strategic cooperation, creating a benchmark for high-quality and pragmatic cooperation; simultaneously, it will continue to amplify the value of Track II diplomacy, relying on think tanks, universities, and people-to-people exchanges to maintain cooperative ties with Nordic countries, consistently adhering to the de-securitization and demilitarization of the Arctic, and safeguarding the overall peace and stability of the Arctic.

Trend 2: Transforming and Upgrading Development Models, Moving Towards Sustainable Cooperation that Prioritizes Ecology, Focuses on Small-Scale and Refined Development, and Emphasizes People’s Livelihoods

In the future, China’s Arctic cooperation will completely abandon the traditional model of «large-scale, asset-heavy, and extensive development», proactively adapting to stringent ecological and public opinion constraints. The focus of cooperation will shift from extensive resource development to low-disruption, high-value, and sustainable niche areas such as polar scientific research, sea ice forecasting, green shipping, cold-region technology export, and polar environmental protection. Simultaneously, the protection of the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples, the preservation of local culture, and the improvement of local livelihoods will be comprehensively incorporated into the cooperation evaluation system, constructing a new cooperation model that promotes ecological, economic, and social synergy.

Trend 3: The «Ice Silk Road» is Undergoing Iterative Upgrades, Moving from Single-channel Navigation to the Construction of a Complete Industrial Chain

The «Ice Silk Road» is far more than just a simple Arctic shipping route; in the medium to long term, it will build a complete industrial system integrating shipping, equipment, technology, services, and regulations. On the one hand, it will continue to promote the regular operation of China — Europe Arctic container services, thereby improving the Arctic logistics channel for high-value-added goods. On the other hand, it will accelerate the research and development of high-ice-class vessels, the development of supporting polar ports, the construction of sea ice monitoring and early warning systems, and emergency search and rescue support systems, while improving supporting services such as shipping insurance and polar logistics. At the same time, it will rationally recognize the temporal and spatial limitations of the Arctic shipping route, avoiding exaggeration of its navigation value and blind expansion of development scale, achieving orderly, controllable, and sustainable development.

Trend 4: Strengthening the Global South Perspective and Building an Inclusive Arctic Governance Discourse System

In the future, China will continue to move beyond the traditional narrative that «Arctic issues = regional national issues», and vigorously advocate a global Arctic concept: Arctic climate change and its ecological impacts are global, and Arctic governance should take into account the sovereignty of regional states, the legitimate rights and interests of non-regional states, and the development rights of indigenous peoples. China will continue to leverage international platforms such as the Northern Forum to promote the reform of Arctic governance mechanisms, oppose exclusive bloc-based approaches, strive for a reasonable voice for the vast number of non-regional Global South states, and create a new paradigm of inclusive, fair, and win-win Arctic governance.

Trend 5: Addressing Domestic Capacity Shortcomings and Building a Systematic Arctic Support System

The upper limit of external cooperation depends on the foundation of domestic capabilities. In the future, China will comprehensively strengthen its Arctic capabilities: addressing shortcomings in polar scientific research hardware and improving a three-dimensional Arctic observation network; tackling core technologies such as polar vessels, cold-region engineering, and deep-sea exploration; cultivating interdisciplinary talents in international law, polar science, less commonly spoken languages, and regional studies; improving domestic laws and regulations on Arctic affairs and cross-departmental coordination mechanisms; strengthening the field research capabilities of think tanks, moving away from reliance on secondary-source narratives, and building an independent, complete, and professional Arctic research and practice system.



Conclusion

Over the past seventy years, China’s understanding of the Arctic has evolved from distant scientific exploration to strategic practice characterized by deep participation, proactive construction, and positive contributions. Driven by the dual transformative forces of climate change and great power competition, the traditional Arctic governance system is undergoing substantial transformation. China’s leading role in promoting the «Ice Silk Road», practical Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and the promotion of inclusive governance concepts are presented as contributing to stability and cooperation into the turbulent and changing Arctic landscape.

The author’s experience of more than ten field research trips and participation in international dialogues concerning the Russian Arctic supports the view that the melting of Arctic glaciers, ecological degradation, and the are challenges facing all of humanity and should not be subordinated to the melting of Arctic glaciers and ecological degradation are challenges great-power rivalry. For decades, China’s Arctic practices have remained true to their original mission: not seeking geopolitical expansion, not participating in bloc confrontation, consistently adhering to international law, aiming for sustainable development, and guided by mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. The article argues that China has become an increasingly significant participant in Arctic cooperation.

Looking to the future, China’s Arctic path will continue to face geopolitical tensions, critical media narratives, rule constraints, and technological barriers. However, the essential need for climate cooperation, the value of mutually beneficial economic and trade outcomes, and the demands of global governance suggest that demand for Arctic cooperation is likely to persist. In the future, China will continue to uphold the Arctic governance principles of respect, cooperation, win-win outcomes, and sustainability, deepen pragmatic cooperation with Russia and all Arctic states, continuously improve the Arctic participation system, provide international public goods, disseminate inclusive governance concepts, safeguard Arctic ecological security, and promote the building of a peaceful, stable, prosperous, and sustainable Arctic future.